(As per readers' demand, presented below is the footnoted
version which appeared in two parts on the immigration law
portal, ILW.com, on 7/2/03-7/3/03).
A CRITICAL LOOK AT BCIS'/DOS' INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CSPA
By Alan Lee†‡
To date, the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services (BCIS) and Department of State (DOS)
have issued five memos on the critical issue of who is eligible
under section 204 of the Immigration & Nationality Act
(covering family based, employment based, and diversity visa
cases) for the benefits of the Child Status Protection Act
(CSPA)1
which was signed into law on August 6, 20022. Regulations have been
drafted but not yet implemented. The BCIS has also been sending
representatives from Washington to explain BCIS thinking on
the law to local BCIS officers and the public. This article
will take a critical look at BCIS and DOS' on-going interpretations
to determine basic eligibility under section 204. The Department
of State has said that it is working closely with the BCIS
on questions of interpretation3,
and so it must be assumed that DOS' view is that of the BCIS.
An overview of official thinking in 204
cases (not including immediate relative situations) as expressed
in the memos and BCIS meeting with the public in New York
on April 10, 2003, is that the first step is determining whether
the case itself qualifies for CSPA consideration4
and that—with few exceptions—the CSPA will only
benefit individuals with adjustment of status or immigrant
visa applications pending on August 6, 2002, where a visa
petition under section 204 was previously approved and individuals
aged out before that day5. The Department of State has postulated
that the CSPA will also apply if the visa petition was approved
before August 6, 2002, but a child did not turn the age of
21 until August 6, 20026.
The official thinking also is that the CSPA will apply if
a petition under section 204 was still pending on August 6,
2002 regardless of whether the child aged out before or after
that date7.
BCIS and DOS- after making this initial
determination of whether the case qualifies under the CSPA-
instruct that the next step is determining whether the particular
individual qualifies under the CSPA as a child8.
For petitions qualifying under a preference classification,
the child's age is only locked in for CSPA benefits where
a visa petition has been filed and approved, and the priority
date is available9.
From the "lock-in" date, the child's age must with
few exceptions be finally calculated to be under 21 on August
6, 2002, to qualify. Setoffs that individuals can use are
the period of time that a petition has been pending and the
45 days available to many individuals under the Patriot Act10.
In examining the BCIS/DOS interpretations
in light of the CSPA statute and legislative history, the
final analysis must be that the official thinking in Washington
thus far is incomplete, strained and incorrect. The restrictive
interpretation on eligibility cannot be said to stem from
the congressional debate.
I. The CSPA's Relevant Sections to 204
Eligibility
To have a proper understanding of the
issues at stake here requires an in-depth look at the CSPA
statute itself, in particular sections 3 and 8:
Sec. 3. Treatment of Certain Unmarried Sons and Daughters
Seeking Status as Family-Sponsored, Employment-Based, and
Diversity Immigrants.
Section 203 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1153) is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(h) Rules for Determining Whether Certain Aliens Are
Children.—
“(1) In General.—For purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A)
and (d), a determination of whether an alien satisfies the
age requirement in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)
of section 101(b)(1) shall be made using—
“(A) the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant
visa number becomes available for such alien (or, in the
case of subsection (d), the date on which an immigrant visa
number became available for the alien’s parent), but only
if the alien has sought to acquire the status of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence within one year
of such availability; reduced by
“(B) the number of days in the period during which the
applicable petition described inparagraph (2) was pending.
“(2) Petitions described.—The petition described in this
paragraph is—
“(A) with respect to a relationship described in subsection
(a) (2) (A), a petition filed under section 204 for classification
of an alien child under subsection (a) (2) (A); or
“(B) with respect to an alien child who is a derivative
beneficiary under subsection (d), a petition filed under
section 204 for classification of the alien’s parent under
subsection (a), (b), or (c).
“(3) Retention of priority date.—If the age of an alien
is determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age
or older for the purposes of subsections (a) (4) and (d),
the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to
the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the
original priority date issued upon receipt of the original
petition.”
Sec. 8. Effective Date.
The amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any
alien who is a derivative beneficiary or any other beneficiary
of—
(1) a petition for classification under section 204 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1154) approved
before such date but only if a final determination has not
been made on the beneficiary’s application for an
immigrant visa or adjustment of status to lawful permanent
residence pursuant to such approved petition;
(2) a petition for classification under section 204 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 154) pending
on or after such date; or
(3) an application pending before the Department of Justice
of the Department of State on or after such date.
Close reading of the law demonstrates
the errors of the BCIS/DOS interpretations.
II. Why a Restrictive Interpretation
is not Warranted Concerning Already Approved Petitions on
the Date of Enactment for Derivative Beneficiaries.
The first lines of the effective date
section (Section 8) clearly state that the CSPA takes effect
on the date of enactment (August 6, 2002) and that it applies
to any alien "who is a derivative beneficiary or any
other beneficiary.... " This phrase modifies and connects
with all 3 parts of section 8. The initial question here
is whether the word "is" should be construed as
meaning the child must have been under 21 on the date of enactment
since the logical argument is that a child no longer qualifies
as a derivative beneficiary or any other type of beneficiary
if he/she has already aged out. However, this cannot serve
as the line of demarcation as both BCIS and DOS have taken
the position under the second part of section 8 eligibility
affecting beneficiaries of "(2) a petition for classification
under section 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
USC 1154) pending on or after such day," that this situation
would still qualify for CSPA benefits regardless of whether
the individual aged out before or after August 6, 200211.
To practitioners in the field, the most
important interpretation deals with Part 1 of section 8, where
a petition was already approved prior to August 6, 2002, and
the beneficiary or derivative beneficiary also aged out prior
to that date. Indeed DOS stated that most of the cases posts
would be likely to see in the first few years would be cases
in which the petition was approved before August 6, 200212. Part 1 places a restrictive clause on pre-August
2002 approved petitions that individuals can only benefit
if a final determination had not yet been made on the "beneficiary's
application" by that date. BCIS and DOS have taken Part
1 to mean that, with few exceptions, any beneficiary or derivative
beneficiary had to have a pending immigrant visa or adjustment
of status application on August 6, 2002 to qualify13. Yet the statute does
not warrant this reading as applied to derivative beneficiaries.
Part 1 clearly states that a final determination must not
have been made on the beneficiary's application, not on a
derivative beneficiary's application. In point of fact, the
statute does not require any application at all by a derivative
beneficiary. The fact that both "derivative beneficiary"
and "any other beneficiary" are mentioned in the
first lines of section 8 but only the "beneficiary's
application" is mentioned in Part 1 shows that, in a
proper reading of the statute, the burden is upon the principal
beneficiary to maintain a live application as of the date
of enactment, and that any derivative beneficiary should be
able to benefit even if aged out by August 6, 2002. As stated
above, the word "is" in the first lines of section
8 has not been construed by either BCIS or DOS as a limitation
on age as of August 6, 2002.
III. Why a Restrictive Interpretation
is not Warranted Concerning the Lock-In Date for Many Aged-Out
Children.
The lock-in date of visa petition approval
and priority date becoming current is applicable to situations
where aged-out children seek to immigrate as children under
the age of 21, but has no applicability where aged-out children
have clearly missed that boat and are relying on CSPA Section
3 eligibility.
Section 3 of the CSPA describes the treatment
to be afforded certain unmarried sons and daughters seeking
status as family sponsored, employment based, and diversity
immigrants. Part 1 defines how an alien can satisfy the age
requirement of a child through looking at the age when an
immigrant visa number becomes available or the date that the
parent’s number becomes available in derivative cases
with credit given for the time that the petition was pending.
In describing the petitions covered, Section 3, part (h)(2),
subsection A includes those for children under the age of
21 and unmarried of permanent residents, and subsection B
those for derivative beneficiary children (alien children
who are not directly petitioned for, but piggyback on petitions
for the parents) where the parents are immigrating on the
basis of family relations, employment, or diversity visas
(visa lottery).
Directly beneath, part 3 reads that if
an alien after going through the calculation of age using
the setoffs for time of petition pending [and 45 days under
the Patriot Act] is over the age of 21 for purposes of any
of the petitions described in parts of section 3, the petition
is to be converted to the appropriate category, "[a]nd
the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon
receipt of the original petition."14
All five memos to date have dealt with
situations in which petitions were approved and children
aged out prior to the enactment date of the CSPA as these
situations are immediate. BCIS and DOS should in the future
issue guidance on the treatment of those cases falling within
part 2 of Section 8 in which petitions are pending or filed
on or after 8/6/02, the priority date will not be current
for many years, and the derivative beneficiary ages out while
the petition is pending but years before the priority date
is available for visa issuance. As clear eligibility under
the statute is present15, BCIS can be expected to reference
the retention of priority date part of section 3 to the effect
that the petitions should be converted automatically to the
appropriate category under which aged-out children would be
eligible to immigrate at a later time when the priority date
is current. In all cases, where applicable, aged-out children
would convert to the F-2B category for unmarried sons and
daughters of permanent residents with a retention of the parent's
priority date. This would mean that in many cases involving
extended waiting times for parents, the aged out children
should be able to save years in immigrating to this country.
For example, in the case of parents immigrating in 2018 on
the basis of a fourth preference sibling petition with a 2002
priority date where the child was 15 years of age at the time
for that petition was filed, the aged out child should be
able to use the 2002 priority date for an automatically converted
petition to the F-2B category in 2018. As the priority date
under the F-2B category would most likely be current for visa
issuance, the speed of immigration would depend upon the mechanism
used by BCIS/DOS to effect the automatic conversion. In a
regular conversion case today where a parent previously petitioned
for his or her spouse and the child was a derivative beneficiary
who aged out in the process, the law requires the petitioner
to file a new I-130 petition to retain the old priority date16. In this case, a mechanism would
have to be devised without the necessity of a further petition
because of the automatic conversion provision. It is entirely
possible that the parents can go through a notification process
either through the BCIS or any other procedure that is acceptable
to BCIS/DOS. Whether this automatic conversion would be made
prior to the parents' immigration so that the family could
immigrate together appears highly unlikely as the appropriate
category for conversion would only become available when the
parents actually immigrate. Because of the need to have an
"appropriate category" under which to immigrate,
aged out children who have married would most likely not be
able to benefit as only U.S. citizen parents can sponsor married
sons or daughters.
The same solution should apply for children
who aged out prior to August 6, 2002, where petitions for
the parents were approved prior to that date, but in which
final determinations had not yet been made on the parent's
cases by that date. Section 8 part 1 clearly speaks about
a final determination being made on the "beneficiary's"
application rather than the derivative beneficiary's. The
first lines of section 8 delineate derivative beneficiaries
as being covered by the section. Ageing out of the derivative
beneficiaries prior to the priority date becoming current
cannot foreclose eligibility under the CSPA as such a reading
would be in violation of the rules of statutory construction
that all terms in a statute are to be given effect17
and that the widest possible range should be given to possible
beneficiaries of the statute18. Thus these aged out children should be deemed covered
by Section 3, part 3 and allowed to retain the original priority
date of the parent's petition for purposes of their own immigration
in the appropriate category. For example, where the parent
is a beneficiary of an F-4 sibling petition with a priority
date of 1991, the petition is approved in 1992, the beneficiary
ages out in 1995, and the parent is only now immigrating,
the aged out child should be able to swiftly immigrate under
the F-2B category using the parent's 1991 priority date.
Of course, if the parent immigrates under other categories
with later priority dates, the aged out child would have to
wait longer to immigrate, e.g.-With a parent's priority date
of March 15, 1998, under the EB-3 category for professional/skilled
workers, the aged out child would have to wait for some years
for the date to clear under the F-2B category which as of
June 2003 is open for individuals filing prior to October
22, 1994.19
IV. A Less Restrictive Interpretation
is Not Refuted by the Legislative Record
DOS in answer to questions posed
by the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) on
March 27, 2003, as to whether the CSPA would cover petitions
that had been approved and the beneficiary aged out--both
events happening before 8/6/02-- in situations where the beneficiary
had not made applications for immigration and thus not had
"final determinations" which would bar them from
eligibility under the CSPA, stated that ageing out could be
considered a final determination and that CSPA section 8's
reference to the "beneficiary's application" could
be interpreted as requiring that the beneficiary actually
have made an application20.
DOS then said that AILA's interpretation "which would
result in resurrecting cases where the alien had aged out
years ago and failed to apply because of that, would present
very serious problems of administration and would not appear
to effectuate Congress's intent to place a meaningful limits
on the law's retroactivity."21
However, this view is not supported by the legislative history
as there was no debate on the question of retroactivity.
The only material on this subject is a Department of Justice
letter contained in House Report 107-45 accompanying the House
bill, H.R. 1209, in April 2001 when the legislation only allowed
relief to immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.22 Concerns were raised by the Department of Justice as
the bill at that stage would have applied to all cases in
which children aged out during the time of processing with
either agency “before, on, or after” the date
of enactment.23
The Justice Department opined that H.R. 1209 's retroactivity
could affect determinations made as long ago as 1952.24
DOJ undoubtedly envisioned the retroactivity clause as affecting
all past adjudications since 1952 because aged-out children
who had immigrated since then in the F-2B or other category
would have to have been reclassified as immediate relatives
on INS entry records. The Department of Justice then wrote,
The general practice with respect to changes in the law
is that the amendments apply to future petitions and those
pending on the date of enactment, but not to determinations
made before the date of enactment. We understand, however,
that Congress may seek to address cases of children who
have aged out in the past. Therefore, if Congress considers
it necessary to address past cases, we would prefer reasonable
limits to retroactivity, such as making the changes retroactively
applicable only to petitions denied as a result of the beneficiary
aging out within a specified period of time. A more limited
retroactivity would provide relief in recent ageout cases
under current or recent immigration law while avoiding the
harmful effects and legal complications of potentially reopening
cases decided decades ago.25
Retroactivity under the correct interpretation
of the CSPA as outlined above would not upset this expectation
of the Justice Department. Congress did give a limited retroactivity
to the CSPA and the BCIS or DOS will not have to look back
any further than August 6, 2002 with limited exceptions as
delineated by the BCIS/DOS26.
The Act requires the beneficiary's case to still be alive
on August 6, 200227. Therefore it would not apply where
no case was before either the BCIS or DOS on that date. Neither
agency would have to worry about digging out cases concluded
decades ago. The Act only provides that a derivative beneficiary
who aged out prior to August 6, 2002 now immigrate under the
"appropriate category."28
Nothing compels either BCIS or DOS to reopen files from long
ago to assign parents' preference categories to aged out children
who may have immigrated under other categories.
V. Rules of Statutory Construction
Demand that the CSPA be Construed Liberally
The rules of statutory construction of
legislation hold that all words in the law be given effect.
Only by ignoring the significance of the word "beneficiary's"
in Section 8 part 1 when seen in light of the words "derivative
beneficiary or any other beneficiary" in the first lines
of that section and the entire text of CSPA Section 3 (h)
(3) can BCIS/DOS justify their present interpretations of
the CSPA. Such selective use of terms in legislation is not
allowed.29
The plain meaning of the words is controlling30, and they mean that a derivative beneficiary is an
intended beneficiary even when he/she aged out and the petition
was approved before the date of enactment so long as the beneficiary
(in most cases the parents) had not yet had a final determination
on their applications for immigrant visas or adjustment of
status to permanent residence pursuant to the approved petition
by August 6, 2002. Also that aliens who age out and cannot
be classified as children are entitled to immigrate under
an “appropriate category” using the priority date
of the original petition. The canons of construction lend
support here in dictating that ameliorative legislation be
given full effect, and that interpretations which restrict
the benefits of the legislation not be upheld.31 Further, if there are
ambiguities in the law, they are to be interpreted in favor
of the alien.32
VI. Conclusion
The CSPA serves a wonderful purpose allowing
families to keep together who have been waiting many years
to immigrate together to the United States. Why should the
child of 15 when the petition was filed who is now still single
and many times still living with the parents but has unfortunately
aged out in the intervening years of waiting be barred from
coming to the U.S. another 7 to 10 years after his/her parents
immigrate to this country? As ameliorative legislation, the
CSPA deserves to affect the widest group of aged out children
that it can reach.
|